CHAPTER 6
1 Corinthians 6:1-8 | |
1. Dare any of you, having a matter against another, go to law before the unjust, and not before the saints? | 1. Audet aliquis vestrum, negotium habens cum altero, litigare sub iniustis, et non sub sanctis? |
2. Do ye not know that the saints shall judge the world? and if the world shall be judged by you, are ye unworthy to judge the smallest matters? | 2. An nescitis, quod sancti mundum iudicabunt? quodsi in vobis iudicatur mundus, indigni estis minimis iudiciis? |
3. Know ye not that we shall judge angels? how much more things pertain to this life? | 3. An nescitis, quod angelos iudicabimus, nedum ad victum pertinentia? |
4. If then ye have judgments of things pertaining to this life, set them to judge who are least esteemed in the church. | 4. Iudicia ergo de rebus ad victum pertinentibus si habueritis, qui contemptibiles sunt in Ecclesia, 1 eos constituite. |
5. I speak to your shame. Is it so, that there is not a wise man among you? no, not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren? | 5. Ad erubescentiam vestram dico: adeo non est inter vos sapiens, ne unus quidem, qui possit iudicare inter fratres? |
6. But brother goeth to law with brother, and that before the unbelievers. | 6. Sed frater cum fratre litigat, idque sub infidelibus. |
7. Now therefore there is utterly a fault among you, because ye go to law one with another. Why do ye not rather take wrong? why do ye not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded? | 7. Jam quidera omnino delictum in vobis est, quod iudicia habetis inter vos: cur non potius iniuriam sustinetis? 2 |
8. Nay, ye do wrong, and defraud, and that your brethren. | 8. Sed vos infertis iniuriam, et fraudatis, et quidem fratres. |
Here, he begins to reprove another fault among the Corinthians -- an excessive fondness for litigation, which took its rise from avarice. Now, this reproof consists of two parts. The first is, that by bringing their disputes before the tribunals of the wicked, they by this means made the gospel contemptible, and exposed it to derision. The second is, that while Christians ought to endure injuries with patience, they inflicted injury on others, rather than allow themselves to be subjected to any inconvenience. Thus, the first part is particular: the other is general.
1.
But here it may be objected: "As it belongs to the office of the magistrate, and as it is peculiarly his province to administer justice to all, and to decide upon matters in dispute, why should not even unbelievers, who are in the office of magistrate, have this authority, and, if they have it, why are we prevented from maintaining our rights before their tribunals?" I answer, that Paul does not here condemn those who from necessity have a cause before unbelieving judges, 4 as when a person is summoned to a court; but those who, of their own accord, bring their brethren into this situation, and harass them, as it were, through means of
2.
What is said here as to judging the world ought to be viewed as referring to that declaration of Christ:
When the Son of Man shall come, ye shall sit, etc.
(Matthew 19:28.)
For all power of judgment has been committed to the Son,
(John 5:22,)
in such a manner that he will receive his
But even in this sense 6 it may seem not to have much weight, for it is as if one should say' "The saints are endowed with heavenly wisdom, which immeasurably transcends all human doctrines: therefore they can judge better as to the stars than astrologers." Now this no one will allow, and the ground of objection is obvious -- because piety and spiritual doctrine do not confer a knowledge of human arts. My answer here is this, that between expertness in judging and other arts there is this difference, that while the latter are acquired by acuteness of intellect and by study, and are learned from masters, 7 the former depends rather on equity and conscientiousness.
But 8 "lawyers will judge better and more confidently than an illiterate Christian: otherwise the knowledge of law is of no advantage." I answer, that their advice is not here excluded, for if the determination of any obscure question is to be sought from a knowledge of the laws, the Apostle does not hinder Christians from applying to lawyers. 9 What he finds fault with in the Corinthians is simply this, that they carry their disputes before unbelieving judges, as if they had none in the Church that were qualified to pass judgment, and farther, he shows how much superior is the judgment that God has assigned to his believing people.
The words rendered in you mean here, in my opinion, among you. For whenever believers meet in one place, under the auspices of Christ, 10 there is already in their assembly a sort of image of the future judgment, which will be perfectly brought to light on the last day. Accordingly Paul says, that the world is judged in the Church, because there Christ's tribunal is erected, from which he exercises his authority. 11
3.
If an angel from heaven bring any other gospel, let him be accursed.
(Galatians 1:8.)
Nor does this exposition appear at first view unsuitable to the thread of Paul's discourse; for if all whom God has enlightened by his word are endowed with such authority, that through means of that word they judge not only men but angels too, how much more will they be prepared to judge of small and trivial matters? As, however, Paul speaks here in the future tense, as referring to the last day, and as his words convey the idea of an actual judgment, (as the common expression is,) it were preferable, in my opinion, to understand him as speaking of apostate 13 angels. For the argument will be not less conclusive in this way: "Devils, who sprang from so illustrious an origin, and even now, when they have fallen from their high estate, are immortal creatures, and superior to this corruptible world, shall be judged by us. What then? Shall those things that are subservient to the belly be exempted from our judgment?
4.
Chrysostom comes near this interpretation, though he appends to it something additional; for he is of opinion, that the Apostle meant to say, that, even though the Corinthians should find no one among themselves who had sufficient wisdom for judging, they must nevertheless make choice of some, of whatever stamp they were. Ambrose touches neither heaven nor earth. 14 I think I have faithfully brought out the Apostle's intention -- that the lowest among believers was preferred by him to unbelievers, as to capacity of judging. There are some that strike out a quite different meaning, for they understand the word
That this statement, however, was taken up wrong by the ancients, appears from a certain passage in Augustine. For in his book -- "On the Work of Monks," where he makes mention of his employments, he declares that among his numerous engagements, the most disagreeable of all was, that he was under the necessity of devoting a part of the day to secular affairs, but that he at the same time endured it patiently, because the Apostle 17 had imposed upon him this necessity. From this passage, and from a certain epistle, it appears that the bishops were accustomed to sit at certain hours to settle disputes, as if the Apostle had been referring to them here. As, however, matters always become worse, there sprang from this error, in process of time, that jurisdiction which the officials of the bishops assume to themselves in money matters. In that ancient custom there are two things that are deserving of reproof -- that the bishops were involved in matters that were foreign to their office; and that they wronged God in making his authority and command a pretext for turning aside from their proper calling. The evil, however, was in some degree excusable, but as for the profane custom, which has come to prevail in the Papacy, it were the height of baseness to excuse or defend it.
5.
7.
In this way, however, he seems to discard entirely judgments as to the affairs of individuals. "Those are altogether in the wrong who go to law. Hence it will not be allowable in any one to maintain his rights by having recourse to a magistrate." There are some that answer this objection in this way -- that the Apostle declares that where there are law-suits there is utterly a fault, because, of necessity, the one or the other has a bad cause. They do not, however, escape by this sophistry, because he says that they are in fault, not merely when they inflict injury, but also when they do not patiently endure it. For my own part, my answer is simply this -- having a little before given permission to have recourse to arbiters, he has in this shown, with sufficient clearness, that, Christians are not prohibited from prosecuting their rights moderately, and without any breach of love. Hence we may very readily infer, that his being so severe was owing to his taking particularly into view the circumstances of the case. And, undoubtedly, wherever there is frequent recourse to law-suits, or where the parties contend with each other pertinaciously with rigor of law, 21 it is in that case abundantly plain, that their minds are immoderately inflamed with wrong dispositions, and are not prepared for equity and endurance of wrongs, according to the commandment of Christ. To speak more plainly, the reason why Paul condemns law-suits is, that we ought to suffer injuries with patience. Let us now see whether any one can carry on a law-suit without impatience; for if it is so, to go to law will not be wrong in all cases, but only
It is surprising that this question has not been more carefully handled by ecclesiastical writers. Augustine has bestowed more pains upon it than the others, and has come nearer the mark; 22 but even he is somewhat obscure, though there is truth in what he states. Those who aim at greater clearness in their statements tell us that we must distinguish between public and private revenge; for while the magistrate's vengeance is appointed by God, those who have recourse to it do not rashly take vengeance at their own hand, but have recourse to God as an Avenger. 23 This, it is true, is said judiciously and appropriately; but we must go a step farther; for if it be not allowable even to desire vengeance from God, then, on the same principle, it were not allowable to have recourse to the magistrate for vengeance.
I acknowledge, then, that a Christian man is altogether prohibited from revenge, so that he must not exercise it, either by himself, or by means of the magistrate, nor even desire it. If, therefore, a Christian man wishes to prosecute his rights at law, so as not to offend God, he must, above all things, take heed that he does not bring into court any desire of revenge, any corrupt affection of the mind, or anger, or, in fine, any other poison. In this matter love will be the best regulator. 24
If it is objected, that it very rarely happens that any one carries on a law-suit entirely free and exempt from every corrupt affection, I acknowledge that it is so, and I say farther, that it is rare to find a single instance of an upright litigant; but it is useful for many reasons to show that the thing is not evil in itself, but is rendered corrupt by abuse: First, that it may not seem as if God had to no purpose appointed courts of justice; Secondly, that the pious may know how far their liberties extend, that they may not take anything in hand against the dictates of conscience. For it is owing to this that many rush on to open contempt of God, when they have once begun to transgress those limits; 25 Thirdly, that they may be admonished, that they must always keep within bounds, so as not to pollute by their own misconduct the remedy which the Lord has permitted them to employ; Lastly, that the audacity of the wicked may be repressed by a pure and uncorrupted zeal, which could not be effected, if we were not allowed to subject them to legal punishments.
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22 Our Author, when treating at some length of the same subject in the Institutes, (volume 3, p. 543,) makes a particular reference to Augustine. (Ep. 5. ad Marcell.) -- Ed.
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